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Europeanization as Process  
Thoughts on the Europeanization  




 The present efforts in Europe to achieve more uniformity in private law and  the debates on a European civil  code need  to  be understood  in a wider context. Europe is plagued by concerns over  its problem‐solving potential  and  its  acceptance  amongst  citizens.  The  response  is  ambi‐tious projects: Eastern Enlargement, a Constitution, a Code. The project of  a European civil  code  is  the  least  visible among  the  three—and yet specifically  instructive.  Europe  has  to  learn  how  the  openness  of  na‐tional markets can coexist with differences in legal cultures, differently shaped relations between state and society. In its multi‐level system of governance none of  the established  legal disciplines can provide guid‐ance for the denationalization and Europeanization of private law. The Europeanization  process  needs  to  be  understood  and  organized  as  a process of discovery and learning. Only then can Europe make produc‐tive use of its diversity. INTRODUCTION European  law  is  affecting more  and more  areas  within  national  legal systems.  The processes of  change  that  it  initiates are  complex and di‐verse,  to an extent that there are good  reasons to concentrate  in their analysis on the discipline one feels most at home with. Hence, constitu‐tional  lawyers  observe  and  comment  on  the  constitutionalization  of Europe, administrative and commercial lawyers primarily on the emer‐gence of  complex European  governance arrangements  throughout  the fields of regulatory politics. At the same time, an autonomous epistemic community  is  engaging  in  a discussion on  the Europeanization of pri‐vate  law with a  growing  number of  individual  themes,  fora,  organisa‐
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tions  and  publications.  Leading  in  terms  of  literary  productivity  are German‐speaking  academics.  The most  recent  habilitation  thesis  I  am aware of was submitted in Munich. It looks beyond the traditional bor‐ders  between  legal  sub‐disciplines  and  focuses  instead  on  the  trans‐formation of private law in the light of the integration process. It is 740 pages  long  (single  spaced).1  But  its  German  speaking  predecessors (there  are  around  10  of  them),  albeit  more  limited  in  scope,  are  not significantly shorter.2 This  is  no  coincidence.  A  tradition  of  legal  science  that  under‐stands the systematic analysis of  the  law as  its core commitment, will naturally  feel  challenged  by  the manifold  impacts of  the Europeaniza‐tion process, and the  less  it becomes possible  for legal science to com‐ply  with  its  own  systematic  expectation,  the  more  its  scepticism towards that process will be fostered. To pose the question in an ironi‐cally sounding, but nonetheless serious,  form: should Europe be about to take suit, to proceed, against our law (bring the law to trial)?3 Taking the question seriously also means not to condemn Europe just because it does not correspond with our  inherited notion of  the  law. The chal‐lenge  flowing  from  the  Europeanization  process  could  be  that  it  will force us to redefine the normative proprium of the law. This,  in  fact,  is  the  thesis of my contribution.  It  sets out  to  show, for  one,  that  the  Europeanization  of  private  law  should  be  seen  as  a process that triggers disintegration within national private law systems and affects their systematic consistency. But I also wish to demonstrate how  that  process manages  to  uncover  productive  and  innovative  op‐portunities. For this, as I suggest by way of conclusion below, it merits recognition: Europeanization must derive  its  legitimacy  from  the  nor‐mative  quality of  the processes within which  it  takes place. There are three  steps  to  my  argument.  The  first  is  fundamental,  in  the  literal sense;  the  legal  disciplines  instructing  the  Europeanization  process assume each in their own way that legal systems are organized nation‐ally; Europe on the other hand constitutes a post‐national constellation; it is no longer an aggregation of nation States, but a multi‐level system (part A). The second part examines three different patterns of  juridifi‐
 
 1. Christoph Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts durch die Europäische 
Union, 2004. 
 2. Since Drexl, Die wirtschaftliche Selbstbestimmung des Verbrauchers, 1998. 
 3. The formulation can be found by Wiethölter, ‘lst unserem Recht der Prozeβ zu 
machen?’, in Honneth et al. (eds.), Zwischenbetrachtungen im Prozeβ der Aufklärung, 1989, 
794. l have previously thought to show, referring to the emergence of ‘new modes of govern-
ance’, that it should be addressed to the European process; see Joerges, ‘Law, Economics 
and Politics in the Constitutionalisation of Europe,’ 5 (2002-2003) The Cambridge Yearbook 
of European Legal Studies, 2004, 123. 
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cation, of Recht­Fertigung (‘justification’),  induced by Europe,  to docu‐ment  the  opportunities  and  risks  borne  by  the  Europeanization  proc‐ess—and  to demonstrate why the process  itself  cannot but disappoint the dogmatic  and  systematic  expectations of  legal  science  (part  B).  In the  final  part,  I will  further  elucidate  the  normative  perspectives  that can be associated with my title, ‘Europeanization as Process’ (part C). A. THE CONTEST OF LEGAL DISCIPLINES AND THE MISERY OF METHODOLOGICAL NATIONALISM Three  legal disciplines are  trying  to unravel and understand the proc‐ess  of  Europeanization:  European  law,  private  international  law  and comparative  law.  They  all  have  different  perspectives  and  introduce contesting  criteria of  law. How are we  to  resolve  the  contest between those legal disciplines4? Should European law Europeanize private law, replace  national  private  laws  with  a  European  private  law?  Is  it  for comparative law to guide the quest  for a suitable system of  legal rules for Europe? But  surely,  it  is private  international  law’s  vocation  to  in‐struct Europe as to how it can reconcile its legal differences, to combine the construction of a  functioning European private law system and the respect  for national  legal  traditions? None of  them,  it  is my claim, can win  the  contest  of  the  disciplines.  None  is  equipped  to  deal  with  the Europeanization process. To be sure,  the  intention  is not to pass  judgment on the capabili‐ties  or  disabilities  of  entire  legal  subjects.  My  argument,  which  pro‐poses the  insolubility of  the contest of  legal disciplines,  rather  follows the specific tradition that underlies the statement, indicated above, that legal science should be prepared to acknowledge Europe’s postnational constellation.5 To follow up on a concretisation of this term, first coined by  Jurgen  Habermas6  and  analysed  by  the  political  scientist  Michael Zürn:  the  individual  legal  disciplines  must  overcome  their  ‘methodo‐logical nationalism,’7 their adherence in terms of concepts and method‐
 
 4. In his famous treatise in 1798, which this section`s heading alludes to, Kant referred 
not only to the sub-disciplines of one faculty. Alluding to Kant`s valuation of philosophy is 
justified: jurisprudence, much to the contrary of Kant’s derisory remarks, cannot limit itself to a 
function that serves given authorities, but must become productive and make use of what 
Kant names ‘reason.’ See Joerges. “The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation 
Process and as a Contest of Disciplines—An Analysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts,”  3 ERPL 3 (1995) 175. 
 5. Above, pre A. 
 6. “Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie,” in: Habermas, Die 
postnationale Konstellation, Politische Essays, 1998, 91. 
 7. Zürn, “Politik in der postnationalen Konstellation,“ in Landfried (ed.), Politik in der 
entgrenzten Welt, 2001, 181. Not only Zürn uses the term (see e.g. Beck, Beyond Methodo-
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ologies  to national  shapes;  these  shapes  are  being  eroded as  a  conse‐quence  of  European  integration  together  with  ‘globalization’  (de‐territorializing  (Entgrenzung)  and  denationalising)  processes.  Again:  I do not wish to pass  judgment on  the state of  those disciplines;  the  in‐tention  is  rather  to highlight  and  reinforce  the developments  that  are verifiably taking place within the law and that should also be reflected by legal science. 
I. European Law My claim, that legal science rather stubbornly adheres to national cate‐gories of  thought, must  sound surprising,  if not  strange,  in  relation  to the discipline I discuss first, namely European law. Is not the European construction exactly the negation, the Überwindung, of the nation state? Is not the specific characteristic of European law precisely that, a claim to  supranational  validity8  without  any  need  for  Europe  to  become  a state  first? And  could  not maybe private  law,  even  though  it  is  a  ‘late comer’ of  the  integration process, become somewhat of  a  test case  for transnational  state‐free  law,  in  particular  when  it  would  require  no more of private law than to revise its own traditions? A  dominating  and most  instructive  topic  currently  under  discus‐sion  within  legal  science  and  legal  policy  concerns  the  case  for—or rejection  of—a  European  Civil  Code.  Numerous  institutional  and  aca‐demic  groupings  have  contributed  to  the  debate  on  the  codification project, in manifold ways. The European Parliament (EP) in its resolutions of 1989 and 1994 pleaded  for  a  European  Civil  Code.9  They  did  not  have  an  immediate impact,10 but did help to keep the idea alive. By now, the EP has become more cautious, or at least more patient.11 The Commission is more sib‐ylline. In its Communication on contract law in 2001,12 it presented four options  and  asked:  Should  the  European  private  law  be  generated through a  contest  between  legal orders?  Should Europe draft Restate­
ments  following the American model? Should it  ‘consolidate’  first what 
 
logical Nationalism, Towards a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent, Constella-
tions 10 (2003), 453), but I keep to Zürn’s interpretation sketched out at IV below. 
 8. ECR [I963], 24 f. Van Gend en Loos. 
 9. OJ C 158/1989, 400 and C 205/1994, 518. 
 10. Cf. Tilmann, ‘Eine Privatrechtskodifikation für die Europäische Gemeinschaft’, in 
Müller-Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen  Gemeinschaft, 1993, 485. 
 11. See the Decision of the European Parliament on the approximation of Member 
States’ civil and commercial law, [COM(2001) 398–C5-047l/2001–2001/2187(COS)] of 15 
November 1001, A5-0384/2001. 
 12. Commission Communication on European Contract Law, COM (2001) 398 final, 11 
July 2001. 
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it has accomplished  in terms of  existing elements of European private law?  Or  should  Europe  embark  on  further  legislative  measures?  The Commission  summarized  responses  to  these  questions  in  its  Action Plan of 12 February 2003.13 The Commission carefully  avoids taking a definitive position. But the  project  of  a  European  Civil  Code  has  had  a  mobilising  effect throughout  legal  science.14  The  most  prominent  academic  writer  and also one of  the most ardent advocates  in  favour of a European code  is Christian  von  Bar.15  Which  of  the  arguments  expressed  in  his  views seem  to  suggest  a  position  of  methodological  nationalism?  Von  Bar more  than  others  emphasizes  that  legislation  should  draw  on  the authority of science and scholarly deliberation rather than politics. His views quite accurately  reflect  the self‐understanding of German schol‐arly thought in the 19th century during the construction of the German Civil Code.16 The German Civil Code put into effect the uniformity of the German Reich and thus symbolizes the emergence of a German nation state. A European Civil Code  could play a  similar part,  as  contribution towards European state‐building, supplementing the political constitu‐tion of Europe. 
II. Comparative Law The process of European  integration has brought  about a  renaissance of  comparative  law.  For  long  decades  it  was—in  Germany  and  else‐where—virtually  self‐evident  that  comparative  research  would  focus on  American  law,  and  only  on  American  law.  In  the  meantime,  the 
Common Core project alone attracts, year after year, a growing number of comparative lawyers from all over Europe and the rest of the world to Trento.17 Comparative case books are available.18 European universi‐
 
 13. Communication of the Commission and the European Parliament and the Council: A 
Coherent European Contract Law, Action Plan, OJ C 43/2003, 1. 
 14. See summary by Schmid. Juristenzeitung, 2001, 694, updated in his habilitation 
thesis (note 1), part 3, section 2; especially on the expert working groups on the Europeaniza-
tion of private law, see: Riedl, Vereinheitlichung des Privatrechts in Europa, 2004. 
 15. See programmatically Von Bar, ‘From Principles to Codification: Prospects for 
European Private Law,’ Columbia Journal of European Law 9 (2002), 379. 
 16. See poignantly Jakobs, Wissenschaft und Gesetzgebung im bürgerlichen Recht 
nach der Rechts- quellenlehre des 19, Jahrhunderts, 1983, 160: the German Civil Code is ‘… 
a code of law, the sources of which can be found not in itself, but in the legal science that has 
created it; a code of law seeking to be dominated by, rather than to dominate, science...’ (my 
translation); see for closer analysis Joerges, Kritische Justiz, 1987, 166. 
 17. Bussani/Mattei (eds.), The Common Core of European Private Law, Essays on the 
Project, 2002; on this and with a further impressive summary of the discipline’s status quo, 
Gambaro, ‘The Trento Theses,’ Global Jurist 4 (2004), No. 1, Article 2. 
 18. Von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, vol. l, I998; Van Gerven/Lever/ 
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ties  have  extended  their  intra‐European  comparative  research  with some enthusiasm, provoking not only quantitative but  also qualitative improvements—a real renaissance. Again,  it would be adventurous to try to force what has become a rich and diverse theoretical debate into a uniform agenda. And just as is the case  for European law, the claim that comparative law is pervaded by methodological  nationalism may  alienate  the  reader  at  first.  But  it holds true, in my view, as shall be demonstrated by turning to the views of two important exponents and opponents. Reinhard Zimmermann, on the  one  hand,  reveals  in  his  numerous works  that  the  common Euro‐pean  legal  heritage,  the  ius  commune  europaeum  continues  to  have  a considerable  impact  in  continental  civil  law  systems  and  throughout the  English  (but  not  the  American)  common  law.  He  seems  to  be sketching  out  the  foundations  of  a  position  in  favour  of  transnational and  non‐state  private  law.19  But  in  his  theoretical  approach,  Zimmer‐mann combines historical studies and practical work on  law. His writ‐ings  on  legal  history  are meant  to  provide  support  to  non‐legislative codification  movements.  It  comes  as  no  surprise  that  the  title  of  the first  section  of  the  Introduction  to  the Historical‐Critical  Commentary on  the  German  Civil  Code  reads:  ‘The  European  Codification  Move‐ment’.20 The section reads further: ‘the codifications have not rendered learned jurists redundant, nor have they led to a permanent consolida‐tion (or  fossilisation) of private  law. But they did  facilitate, on the one hand, national fragmentation of legal traditions…on the other, the codi‐fications ended the  ‘second  life’  of Roman  law, the history of  its direct practical  application…  .’21  The  Europeanization  of  private  law  cannot and should not rewind the clock of history. But historical legal scholar‐ship  is trying to feed  into it an awareness of  its pan‐European founda‐tions—to  boost  the European codification project which would  create and symbolise a uniform European legal space. At the opposite end of the spectrum of comparative contributions is  Pierre  Legrand.22  His  non‐convergence  thesis,  his  rigid  opposition 
 
Larouche/von Bar/Viney, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and Interna-
tional Tort Law, Scope of Protection, 1998. 
 19. See Zimmermann, Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 193 (1993), 122–169: idem, 
Roman Law and European Legal Unity, in Hartkamp/Hesselink/Hondius/Joustra/Du Perron 
(eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 2nd ed. 1998, 21; idem. ‘Savignys Vermächtnis,’ in 
Caroni/Dilcher (eds.), Norm und Tradition, Welche Gerschichtlichkeit für die Rechtsgeschich-
te?, 1998, 281. 
 20. Zimmermann, Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar, paras. 1 ff. before § 1 (2003). 
 21. My translation. 
 22. Poignantly, e.g.: ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging,’ International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 45 (1996), 52; ‘Against a European Civil Code,’ Modern Law 
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against  functionalism  in  comparative  law  and  against  codification movements is based upon the assertion that common law and civil law cannot  communicate  because  the  law  is  a  cultural  phenomenon  and European legal cultures have developed, quite simply, in an incompati‐ble way. Both Zimmermann and Legrand loosen ties between  law and the nation state. Yet,  both remain themselves tied to a methodological nationalism.  Zimmermann  in  that  he  seeks  to  follow  the  example  of historical legal science in the codification movement, Legrand in that he deduces  from  the  cultural  features  of  common  law and  civil  law  their political autonomy.23 
III. Private International Law European and Private International Law (PIL) lived separate lives for a long time, encouraged by a culture of non‐communication where Euro‐pean  lawyers were part of public  law  and  PIL‐lawyers  part of private law.  Thus,  for  a  long  time  it went practically unnoticed  that  the Euro‐pean Court of  Justice (ECJ) adjudicated constellations that had already been thoroughly thought through by PIL. Nowhere did overlaps receive greater attention and were discussed earlier  than  in Germany. Discus‐sions  can  be  separated  into  several  stages: One phase, where  PIL was recommended  as  an  alternative  to  projects  suggesting  unification  of law.24  A  second  one,  still  ongoing, where  European  law—in  particular its  fundamental  freedoms  and  the  ban  of  discrimination,  but  also  its provisions  on mutual  recognition  of  binding  law—was  and  is  used  to correct  PIL.25  A  third  phase  is  approaching.  This  phase  will  see  the choice‐of‐law  methodology  pulling  away  from  its  traditional  home discipline and in particular from its orientation towards a geographical idea of justice. This is happening  in two ways. For one,  inconsistencies 
 
Review 60 (1997), 44. 
 23. These are no more than cursory remarks. Hein Kötz, representing the lead-
ingfunctionalistschool of comparative law, has always been sceptical towards the idea 
of codification, see his Gemeineuropäisches Zivilrecht, Festschrift Konrad Zweigert. 1981, 
481; methodologically strict exponents of the common core project are agnostic in terms of 
legal policy: e.g. Bussani, ibid. (note 17), but also Mattei, ‘Hard Code Now!’, Global Jurist 
Frontiers, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002), Art. 1. The Gretchen question, however, remains whether 
comparative law can give up its perception of autonomous legal systems. How can we con-
ceptualise their interdependencies and the emergence of multi-level systems with intercon-
nected competences? 
 24. See e.g. Kreuzer, ‘Die Europäisierung des internationalen PrivatrechtsVorgaben 
des Gemeinschaftsrechts,’ in: Müller-Graff, Gemeinsames Privartecht in der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, 1993, 273. 
 25. See Grundmann, Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht 
64 (2000), 457. Summary and analysis of current developments in Schmid (note 1), espe-
cially in part 3, section 1. 
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within  and  between  national  law26  and  European  law27 will  be  recon‐structed as ‘collisions’ and conflicts arising from the institutionalization of different  rationality  criteria. Accordingly  the  idea  that  law could  be set up as a stable, permanent and  ‘uniform’ system will be done away with.  Contributions  describing  the  law  of  a  multi‐level  system  and  in particular  European  law  as  a Kollisionsrecht,  a  ‘collision  law’,  increas‐ingly demonstrate a thinking of law in constantly recurring collisions.28 More on this will be said below.29 
IV. Interim Conclusion and Anticipation: the Misery of Methodological 
Nationalism in Europe’s Postnational Constellation The claim that our categories of  legal science and our  individual disci‐plines  attach  themselves  to  the  nation  state  is  anything  but  exciting. Equally, it should not come as a surprise that legal science—in constitu‐tional  and  administrative  as  well  as  private  law—draws  on  national and  federal  examples.  The  connected  question, however, whether—in legal sociological  terms—it  is possible to halt  the evolution of  law be‐yond the nation state, and—in legal theoretical terms—the debate sur‐rounding  the  normative  legitimacy  of  these  developments,  bear  some potentially explosive issues. The situation in the European Union inevitably requires a look, as indicated above, into the political science research on integration. For a long time, we have been reading that Europe  is more than an  interna‐tional organization, but less than a federation.30 To understand its posi‐
 
 26. Intellectually groundbreaking but little noticed: Wiethölter, Begriffs- oder Interessen-
jurisprudenzfalsche Fronten im IPR und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht: Bemerkungen zur 
selbstgerechten Kollisionsnorm, Festschrift Kegel, 1977, 223; analysis by Teubner. ‘Der 
Umgang mit den Rechtsparadoxien: Derrida, Luhmann, Wiethölter,’ in: Joerges/Teubner 
(eds.), Rechtsverfassungrecht, Recht-Fertigung zwischen Privatrechtsdogmatik und Gesell-
schaftstheorie, 2003, 22. 
 27. See Joerges, ‘Legitimationsprobleme des europäischen Wirtschaftsrechts und der 
Vertrag von Maastricht,’ in: Brüggemeier (ed.), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa, 1994, 91. 
 28. Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Percep-
tions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutionalist Perspective,’ European Law Journal 3 
(1997), 378; Furrer, Zivilrecht im gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kontext. Das Europäische Kollisi-
onsrecht als Koordinierungsinstrument für die Einbindung des Zivilrechts in dax europäische 
Wirtschaftsrecht, 2002; Amstutz, Zwischenwelten, Zur Emergenz einer interlegalen Rechts-
methodik im europäischen Privatrecht, Joerges/Teubner, ibid. (note 26), 213; Vesting, Veröf-
fentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 63 (2004), 41, 65 ff.; Schmid 
(ibid. note 1) part 3, section 1; Teubner/Fischer-Lescano, ‘Regime-Collision: How the Emer-
gency of Private Governance Regimes Changes Global Legal Pluralism,’ Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 2004 (forthcoming). 
 29. Below B. II. and C. I. 
 30. W. Wallace, `Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: The Community as a 
Political System,’ in H. Wallace/W. Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Commu-
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tion  between  these  two  poles  as  a  ‘multi‐level  systems  sui  generis’  is somewhat  of  a  dominating  view  in  political  science31  which  is  being further substantiated in respective studies. Before introducing the idea into  legal  science,  it  should  be  reconstructed  in  normative  categories. But this is anything but easy. In his essay introducing the ‘postnational constellation’  as  a  term  of  art,32  Jürgen  Habermas  posed  the  crucial question  whether  there  was  a  future  for  democracy.  Democracy  was institutionalised in (national) constitutional states. Therefore, postnational constellations are highly ambivalent; they constitute  not  an  achievement  but  rather  a  challenge.  The  thesis  in which Michael Zürn diagnoses  the misery of methodological national‐ism33  suggests  that we  cannot  avoid  the  challenge,  because  our  entry into the postnational constellation is not at our disposition. His diagno‐ses  affect  mostly  the  contextual  conditions  of  political  action:34  The nation  state  is  no  longer  in  a  position  to  define  its  political  priorities autonomously (as sovereign), but instead is forced to coordinate them transnationally.  Not  only  must  their members  (national  citizens)  rec‐ognise  their  political  action;  states  have  also  become  accountable  to transnational bodies where their politics are being subjected to evalua‐tion. To be sure, national governments continue to vehemently defend their fiscal powers. “Whilst resources remain (in most part) at national level,  the  formulation of politics has been  internationalised and recog‐nition transnationalized.”35 How  will  this  type  of  multidimensional  disaggregation  of  state‐hood  affect  the  law?  First  of  all,  we  should  be  prepared  to  find  the transnational (European) level of politics confronting national law with a  range  of  demands  arising  from  the  interconnectedness  of  nation states (in other words, the logic of integration of societal sub‐systems), and  from  the  project  of  integration  and  its  institutionalised  political telos manifested in the European Treaties. Neither the national nor the transnational dimension gives a  firm halt; both are  instead themselves in a state of contingent development. The thesis suggesting that we are and will be witnessing tensions between a functionalist logic of market integration  institutionalised  in  the  Treaties  and  a  normative  logic  of justification,  of  Recht­Fertigung,  institutionalised  at  national  level,  in 
 
nity, 1983, 403. 
 31. Instructive are contributions to Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch (eds.), Europäische 
Integration, 2nd ed., 2003. 
 32. Above note 6. 
 33. Above note 7. 
 34. Ibid., 188-191. 
 35. My translation; ibid., 188. 
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my  view  continues  to  have much  persuasive  force  as  a  starting  point and  basis  for  approximation.36  It  implies:  law  has  to  learn  how  to  ac‐commodate disaggregated competences of action and the fact that in a European  multi‐level  system  the  ‘higher’  level’s  competences  are  re‐stricted to the fields enumerated  in the Treaty, that Europe hence can‐not form a hierarchical system but instead relies on a plethora of policy networks and on cooperative problem solving. Any attempt to illustrate or  concretise  these  formulae  is  bound  to  fail  the  systematic  expecta‐tions and traditional thought patterns. B. EXEMPLA TRAHUNT: THREE PATTERNS OF EUROPEANIZATION OF PRIVATE LAW ‘Less than a “system”, but more than just a set of contingent case law’—thus  the  claim  of  the  following  analyses  of  the  practice  of Europeanization  of  private  law.  It  would  be  unrealistic  to  accredit  to the law the power to assert  itself as a  ‘system’ within the complex and conflict  ridden  territory  of  the  European  multi‐level  system.  But  any suggestion  to  break  the  law  down  into  a  string  of  individual  cases would  be  equally  far  from  reality.  Three  sets  of  examples  are  being introduced,  exemplifying  in  turn  some  significant  patterns  of Europeanization  of  private  law.  Their  ‘exemplicity’  is  manifested particularly in the range of options they uncover for integration policy. In  saying  this,  I  implicitly  suggest  that  these  options  include  diverse, even  opposite  perspectives.  I  also  assert  that  their  contest  will  not come to a rest, that we should not expect any one pattern to acclaim a monopoly  at  any  time  in  the  future.  Rather,  each  individually  will  be subjected  to  a  range  of  experiences  that  in  turn  will  provoke  further learning  processes.  Here  is  not  the  place  to  advocate  normative agnosticism.  Having  said  that,  it  should  be  stressed  that  the  law  will have to be prepared to deal with colliding concepts of Europeanization. 
I. Product Liability Law: on the Destitution of Orthodox Supranationalism The  European  Community  Product  Liability  Directive  was  adopted unanimously,  under  (the  old  version  of)  Article  100  TEC,  on  25  July 1985.37  This  explains  why  it  records  product  liability  law  so  incom‐pletely,38 why  it disappointed expectations especially of  those who ex‐
 
 36. See Joerges/Brüggemeier, ‘Europäisierung des Vertrags- und Haftungsrechts,’ in: 
Müller·Graff (ed.), Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Eurupäischen Gemeinschaft, 1993, 233. 
 37. OJ L 2l0/1985. 29. 
 38. Koch, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 152 (1988), 537. 
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pected  it  to  be  the  flagship  of  European  consumer  protection  law.39 Intense  debates  surrounded  the  Directive’s  implementation.  It  was widely considered a marginal piece of  legislation with  little  impact on the general  law of obligations  because Article 13 of  the Directive evi‐dently did not respect claims pursuant to other legal bases.40 There was, at any rate, broad agreement that the Directive would preclude further advances in consumer protection law by establishing a set of conclusive minimum standards. For  a  long  time,  these  expectations  appeared  justifiable,  until,  in three relatively recent  judgments of 25 April 2002,41  the ECJ shattered them quite dramatically. The Court recognised to the great surprise of most  observers  that  the  Directive’s  consumer  protection  provisions were  not  intended  to  introduce  protective  minimum  standards,  but rather  to  achieve  ‘complete  harmonisation’  As  a  consequence,  the  Di‐rective enjoys the standing of fully‐fledged European law: it is supreme to  national  private  law,  takes  precedence  over  subsequent  national legislation and creates a duty for national courts to refer to the ECJ. The three decisions just mentioned concern the French, the Greek and  the  Spanish  implementation  of  the  Directive.  The  Spanish  case  is particularly  frightening.42  Mrs.  Gonzalez  Sanchez  had  to  have  a  blood transfusion  in  the hospital  run  by  the defendant  institution  (Medicina Asturiana  SA).  As  a  consequence  of  the  transfusion,  she  was  infected with  the  Hepatitis  C  virus.  She  based  her  action  on  the  law  by which Spain had transposed the Directive into Spanish law and, in addition, on the general liability provisions of Spanish civil law, and on the Spanish General Law for the Protection of Consumers and Users of 19 July 1984, under which the claimant had only to prove damage and a causal con‐nection.  Under  the  Product  Liability  Directive,  implemented  10  years after  the  1984  law,43  she  also  had  to  prove  that  the  hospital  had  pro‐duced  the  blood  conserves,  which  she  failed  to  show.  Therefore,  the success  of  her  claim  depended  on  the  relationship  between  the  three legal bases. Article 13 of the Directive provides that the Directive “shall not affect any rights which an injured person may have according to the 
 
 39. See Brüggemeier/Reich, Wertpapier Mitteilungen 1986, 149. 
 40. E.g. Brüggemeier, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 152 
(1988), 511, 531. 
 41. Case C-52/00, ECR [2002] I-3827 Commission v. France; Case C-183/00, ECR 
[2002] I·3901 Mari}: MarÍa Victoria González Sánchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA; Case C- 
154/00, ECR [2002] I-3879 Commission v. Greece. 
 42. On the following, see analyses by Arbour, ELJ 10 (2004), 87 and Schmid (ibid., note 
1), especially part 2, section 4, chapter 5. 
 43. Case C-183/00 para. 7, 8. 
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rules of  the  law of  contractual or non‐contractual  liability or  a  special liability system existing at the moment when this Directive is notified.” Does  this  mean,  the  Spanish  court  asked  the  ECJ,  that  the  Directive could  “be  interpreted  as  precluding  the  restriction  or  limitation,  as  a result of  transposition of  the Directive, of rights granted to consumers under  the  legislation of  the Member  State?”44 To  the unversed  reader, the  question may  sound  rhetorical.  But  the  Court  responded:  “Article 13 of  the Directive cannot be  interpreted as giving  the Member States the possibility of maintaining a general system of product  liability dif‐ferent from that provided for in the Directive.”45 The provision that Article 13 does not affect claims on a different basis cannot “be relied on  in such a case in order to justify the mainte‐nance  in  force of national provisions affording greater protection than those of the Directive.”46 In  its analysis of  the Community  law provisions,  the ECJ refers to Recital  1  in  the  preamble  of  the  Directive,  according  to  which  “ap‐proximation  is  necessary  because  legislative  divergences may  distort competition  and  affect  the  movement  of  goods  within  the  common market  and  entail  a  differing  degree  of  protection  of  the  consumer against  damage  caused  by  a  defective  product  to  his  health  or  prop‐erty.”47 It had been necessary at the time to introduce this sentence, in order  to  ‘establish’  the  Community’s  (functional)  legislative  compe‐tence.  Since then,  the paragraph has become neither more empirically relevant,  nor  normatively  more  correct.  Nevertheless,  the  Court’s judgment reaffirmed its value as a virtually teleological motivation for restricting Member States’ legislative autonomy.48 European  law, understood this way, does not contribute much to the  Europeanization  process.  The  preliminary  rulings  procedure  has good institutional sense because it links the judiciary in Member States to the  jurisdiction of  the ECJ. But  it can bear painful consequences  for those who  seek  justice  in  a  case  that would  not  normally  seem prob‐lematic.49 After long years of litigation, Mrs. Sanchez finally knew whom she would have had to sue in order to enforce her rights. A result such as this one would be easier to accept, if we could see  in the ECJ’s judg‐
 
 44. Ibid., para. 13. 
 45. Ibid.. para. 30. 
 46. Ibid., para. 33. 
 47. Ibid., para. 3. 
 48. Ibid., paras. 24, 25. 
 49. More generally Joerges, ‘The Bright and the Dark Side of the Consumer’s Access to 
Justice in the EU,’ Global Jurist Topics 1 (2001): No. 2, Article 1. 





Citizensand their Bars The judgments in Centros,51 Überseering52 and Inspire Art53 are part of a single  complex which  should  be discussed  in unity, but  at  this  point  I will  focus on a particular aspect often shaded by a plethora of  literary analysis. From the interplay between the economic freedoms, the legis‐lative and  the  judiciary,  emerges  the  right  to hold  the  national  sover‐eign  to  account  for  its  legislation  and  to  confront  it  with  the  legal rationality  of  its  European  neighbours—this  to  me  is  the  normative significance of the Centros case law, but equally its practical weakness.54 The  judgment  in Centros  concerns  the  core  of  the  European  legal 
acquis, namely the freedoms of market citizens which apply directly and ought  therefore  to  take  primacy  over  national  law.  The  decision  was widely praised as a milestone in the realization of the market freedoms, as a contribution to the so‐called negative integration and the opening up of regulatory competition; but it also has wider implications. A  Danish  married  couple,  Marianne  and  Tony  Bryde,  wished  to import wine into Denmark. For this they planned to set up a company, but did not want  to pay  the  fee of  the DK 200,000  (28,000 Euro)  that Denmark required for the registration of companies.  In May 1992 they founded  a  private  Limited  company  in  England,  the  now  legendary Centros Ltd., and set up a subsidiary in Copenhagen—for none of these steps did they need the money that a regular registration  in Denmark would  have  required.  Unsurprisingly,  the  Danish  authorities  refused registration.  The  Brydes  went  to  court.  Seven  years  later,  the  ECJ handed  down  the  following  judgment  to  the  referring  Danish Højesteret. It found, rightly, that:  It  is contrary to Articles 52 and 58 of the Treaty for a Mem‐ber State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed 
 
 50. See below C. III. 
 51. Case C-212/97, ECR [1999] I-1459 Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen. 
 52. Case C-208/00, ECR [2002] I-9919 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Com-
pany Baumanagement GmbH (NCC). 
 53. Case C-167/01, Kanter van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art 
Ltd, U. of 30 September 2003. 
 54. See Joerges, ‘Zur Legitimität der Europäisierung des Privatrechts. Überlegungen zu 
einem Recht-Fertigungs-Recht für das Mehrebenensystem der EU,’ in Joerges/Teubner, ibid. 
(note 26), 183, 189–194. 
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in  accordance  with  the  law  of  another  Member  State  in which it has its registered office but in which it conducts no business  where  the  branch  is  intended  to  enable  the  com‐pany  in question to carry on  its entire business  in the  state in  which  that  branch  is  to  be  created,  while  avoiding  the need  to  form  a  company  there,  thus evading  application of the  rules  governing  the  formation  of  companies  which,  in that state, are more restrictive as regards the paying up of a minimum share capital.55 
 Did the Court permit the Brydes,  in Gerhard Kegel’s well phrased words,56 to ‘cock a snoot’ at the law? Or, and this may be the case’s most popular reading, was it the ECJ’s intention to allow for a more efficient legal framework for company law in Europe?57 Maybe  the  truth  lies  in  the  middle?  What  is  so  abusive,  really, about setting up a company in another Member State with a seemingly more  beneficial  regulatory  system?  Should we  not  simply  understand it—as  the  ECJ  does—as  the  exercise  of  a  right  afforded  to  European citizens, a right which however will cede to  legitimate regulatory con‐cerns—foreclosing the concerns of those who warn against the superi‐ority of  economic against political  reason.  The ECJ did  not push aside Denmark’s right to enact compulsory provisions dealing with company law.  It placed Denmark under pressure to  justify why Danish registra‐tion fees would better serve the protection of creditors, which, accord‐ing  to  the  Danish  government’s  presentation,  was  the  object  of  the Danish  legislation.  The  Court  remained  unconvinced,  partly  because foreign companies were allowed to set up branches  in Denmark with‐out having to pay a registration fee. There are obvious parallels  to  the  jurisdiction on Article 28 TEC, which since Cassis de Dijon,  thus  for the past 34 years, has repeatedly found that Community  law must preserve and respect national  auton‐omy  (‘autonomieschonend’),  whilst  national  laws  must  pursue  their legitimate  regulatory  interests  in  conformity  with  Community  law (‘gemeinschaftsverträglich’).  In  other  words:  Danish  citizens  have  the right to test  their national sovereign  in a European court—the Brydes made use of their right.  In case  it  is found to be  in breach of European law, the Danish legislator is given the chance to amend its laws—and it 
 
 55. Sentence 1 of the tenor of the judgment, ECR [1999] I-1947. 
 56. In his editorial in Zeitschrift für Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (8) 1999 
(`Es ist was faul im Staate Dänemark und anderswo...`). 
 57. See Eidenmüller, ‘Wettbewerb der Gesellschaftsrechte in Europa,’ ZIP 2002, 2233. 
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has  done  so.58  The  new  regulation,  justified  by  legitimate  concerns  of the Danish government to secure tax demands, may be called into ques‐tion  again.  It  remains  to  be  seen—e.g.  whether  the  Brydes  are  again prepared to invest 10 years to challenge existing Danish law. 
Centros  has  not  remained without  consequences.  The  possibility that  interested  actors  would  try  to  test  how  far  their  new  freedoms would  reach  and  how  much  money  they  would  save,  was  easily  pre‐dictable yet  little  investigated.59 Debate  about  the  implications of Cen­
tros  in  terms  of  legal  systematique was however,  dense;  it helps us  in better understanding  the  two  following decisions.  In a  reference  for  a preliminary ruling by the Federal High Court of 30 May 2002 (Überseer­
ing),60  the  ECJ was  asked whether  German  law  could  prevent  a Dutch plaintiff from suing for over 1,000,000 DM by, firstly, restricting in § 50 (1)  of  its  Zivilprozessordnung  locus  standi  to  those  legally  competent (rechtsfähig)  companies,  and  secondly,  by prescribing  that  a  company incorporated according to Dutch law could lose its legal capacity once it transferred its activities to Germany in a way which constitutes, accord‐ing  to  German  law,  a  transfer  of  its  ‘seat’  or  legal  headquarters  (Ver­
waltungssitz).61  In an  internal market where  freedom of establishment exists  as  a  right,  such  legal principles  seem downright  incredible.62  In 
Inspire Art63 the ECJ continued its line of reasoning, and established: the right of a company set up under English law to carry on business in the Netherlands  should  be  respected  in  principle; only  for  ‘good’  reasons, not  accounted  for  in  European  secondary  legislation, may  this  funda‐mental freedom be restricted. The  Centros  judgment  found  Denmark’s  regulatory  interests  per se  legitimate.  In  the  follow‐up  decisions,  there  was  no  need  for  the 
 
 58. See Trefil, Centros und die Niederlassungsfreiheit von Gesellschaften in Europa, 
EUI Working Paper Law 2003/9, http://www.iue.it/PUB/law03-9.pdf, 3l ff., referring to 
www.retsinfo.dk and the doubts about the solidarity of the Danish ‘Sonderweg.’ 
 59. lnstructively Baudisch. ‘From Status to Contract? An American Perspective on 
Recent Developments in European Company Law,’ in Snyder (ed.), The European Union and 
Governance, 2003, 24, 44 ff., who considers a ‘race to the bottom’ unlikely, because of 
existing interests for businesses in their reputation. 
 60. German Federal Court, BGH Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 2000, 412. 
 61. See para. 45 of the Opinion of Advocate-General Colomer on 4 December 2001 for 
Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v. NCC GmbH. 
 62. Eventually the representation made by the German government, that the plaintiff 
could have acted as a company without legal personality under German law (cited in AG 
Colomer`s Opinion at para. 55: see also Roth, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfah-
rensrechts 2003, 117, 123 f.), will not suffice; poignantly Schanze/Jüttner, Die Akteingesell-
schaft 2003, 30. 
 63. Case C-167/01, U. v. 30.09.2003, Kamer van Koophandel v. Inspire Art Ltd., Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 2003, 3331. 
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Court to discuss the bars to the fundamental freedoms. But these ques‐tions have become  increasingly pressing: how are the general reasons in  favour of the ‘seat’ theory (Sitztheorie)—protection of creditors and of  subsidiary  companies;  co‐determination;  avoidance  of  double  taxa‐tion—to be accounted  for  in  the  future? Not by  invoking  the  seat  the‐ory!  In Europe’s multi‐level system, the  latter  is equally  as obsolete as its  counterpart,  the  ‘incorporation’  theory  (Gründungstheorie).  Both have no place in Europe’s postnational constellation.64 Their objectives must be expressed in different terms65 and addressed in a way so as to conform with Community principles.66  
III. Altmark Trans: Public Services after Privatization One of the most important characteristics of the Europeanization proc‐ess  is  that  it disconnects what  is  traditionally considered  ‘private  law’ from its regulatory context. This  is one of  the  inevitably disintegrative effects  of  integration,  legally  rooted  in  one  of  the  Community’s  core principles:  the  EU’s  competences  are  restricted  to  the  fields  enumer‐ated in the Treaty. Amongst them we find practically the whole field of regulatory law, and the Community has used those competences exten‐sively.67 The real world, however, continuously brings up constellations where  the  demarcation  of  competences  in  the  Treaty  does  not  corre‐spond with  real  existing  and  interconnected  regulatory  problem  con‐stellations.  Typically,  the European  level  is  competent  to  regulate  one aspect  of  a  problem,  whereas  Member  States  remain  competent  to 
 
 64. Clearly Schanze/Jüttner, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2003, 681, 685. 
 65. Especially Schanze/Jüttner, ibid., and Ulmer, Juristenzeitung 999, 662 and Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 2004, 1201 illustrate convincingly how this is possible. 
 66. The German co-determination rules are the most complicated, because they lack 
any functional equivalent elsewhere (see Dammann, 8 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 607).  
Co-determination may not be imposed on an undertaking simply because it uses its right to 
establishmentand vice versa: Community law may not dispense with an institution such as 
the German co-determination procedure, simply because it disturbs companies' freedom of 
establishment. It is instead left to initiate political processes through institutionalisation of 
existing tensions. An example, at first sight a little remote: the practices engaged by Microsoft 
in the US and in the EU are judged differently in either legal order. But where the EU, as was 
declared by the Commission on 24 March 2004, imposes its law in Europe, then it takes away 
de facto rights and freedoms Microsoft enjoys under US law. The EU can avail itself of a legal 
framework that does not leave these types of dilemmas to lie [with expected effects: see 
Sadowski/Junkes/Lindenthal, Labour Co·determination and Corporate Governance in Ger-
many, in: Schalbach (ed.). Corporate Governance, Essays in Honor of Horst Albach, 2nd ed. 
2003. 144]. 
 67. Jacques Delors in a slightly outdated but much cited statement announced that 80 
per cent of the economic law in Member States should be determined by the Community. 
Delors. ‘Europa im Umbruch. Vom Binnenmarkt zur Europäischen Union.’ in Kommission der 
EG (ed.), Europäische Gespräche, vol. 9. 1992, 12. 
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regulate  another  one.  The  term  ‘diagonal’  is  used  to  distinguish  such constellations  from,  on  the  one  hand,  ‘vertical’  conflict  resolutions where Community law trumps national law, and from ‘horizontal’ con‐flicts  which  arise  from  differences  among  the  Member  States’  legal systems and which belong to the domain of PIL on the other.68 The term ‘diagonal conflicts’ captures a structural characteristic of the European multi‐level system. Neither the European level nor the national level is in a position to address a specific problem in its entirety: European and national actors are forced to coordinate. Examples are legion, even though they do not always appear in the literature  under  the  heads  I  have  just  indicated.69  I  restrict  myself  to one: The Altmark Trans judgment of 24 July 200370 illustrates the impli‐cations  of  the  privatization71  of  public  services,  induced  by  European law;  these  Europeanized  so‐called  ‘Services  of  General  Interest’  or ‘Daseinsvorsorge’  are  controversial because they meet with  firmly em‐bedded national  regulatory  traditions,  expectations and  interests. The regulations they affect are not as much intertwined with private law as they may be in constellations where national private law pursues regu‐latory  goals  that may  collide with  some  goals  of  European  regulatory law. However, privatization initiatives are a major concomitant of inte‐gration; they affect the realm of private law as they determine to what extent services can be brought by and in conformity with the market. ‘Daseinsvorsorge’ was brought under the auspices of public law on the  basis  that  it  affected  basic  human  requirements  in  industrialised times. The German term was coined by no less than Karl Jaspers before 1933. The fact  that Ernst Forsthoff  in 1938 re‐applied the term  in the context of administrative law72 is no argument as such. In any case, it is correct  to  say  that  in  the  first  place  Daseinsvorsorge  had  to  gain  the social and democratic  legitimacy used today  in  its defence. Those who acknowledge its value, e.g. the British social philosopher Steven Lukes, must  fear the  ‘invasions of  the market’73  in Europe;  those who find no 
 
 68. See also Schmid (note 1), part 3, section 1, sub-section 1, chapter 2. 
 69. But see Schmid (note 1), part 3, chapter 2. 
 70. Case C·280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH v. Regierungspäisidium Magdeburg und 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, nyr. 
 71. On this process see ‘Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe` 
(COM (1996) 443 final of 11 September 1996), ‘Report on Services of General Interest` 
(COM (2001) 598 final of 17 October 2001) and the ‘Green Paper on Services of General 
Interest` (COM(2003) 270 final of 21 May 2003). 
 72. ‘Daseinsvorsorge als Aufgabe der modernen Verwaltung,’ idem., Die Verwaltung als 
Leistungsträger, 1938. 
 73. Lukes, ‘Invasions of the Market,’ in Dworkin et al. (eds.), From Liberal Values to 
Democratic Transition, 2003. Lukes argues within the anglo-saxon tradition: ‘As Marshall 
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place for it in a social welfare state, such as the expert committee to the German Federal Ministry of Commerce, would regard its protection by legal norms as an encroachment of ‘the citizens’ subjective rights, guar‐anteed  by  the  Community,  to  unhampered  participation  in  the  cross‐border transfer of goods and services’.74 
Altmark  Trans  concerned  subsidies  awarded  to  public  transport undertakings  in  the  Landkreis  of  Stendal  in  Germany.  The  case  itself may  seem  insignificant,  yet  the  ensuing  questions  are  of  fundamental importance: should availability of public transport be organised on the basis of social welfare and distributional justice or on the basis of effi‐ciency? Is this an openly political question to be decided by the German Lander  and  communes,  or  a  legal  question  for  Community  law  to  an‐swer? The ECJ knew not to decide these questions definitively, but  in‐stead  to  design  a  legal  framework  which  leaves  room  for  political processes and decisions—and still protects European concerns. This is, it seems to me, the core message of the decision which also brought up difficult  questions of  law concerning  the  interplay  between  secondary Community  law  and  the  German  public  transport  law  (Personenbe­
förderungsgesetz)  as  amended  in  1995.  Altmark  Trans  GmbH  and 
Nahverkehrsgesellschaft mbH  both  sought  to organise public  transport in  the  Landkreis  of  Stendal  in  Sachsen–Anhalt,  one  of  the  German Lander. Altmark had been licensed, and got the license renewed by the Regierungspräsidium, whereas the bid of Nahverkehrsgesellschaft mbH was  rejected.  The  central  question  of  law  occupying  the  ECJ was:  did the  subsidies  given  to Altmark  Trans  after  it  had  been  granted  the  li‐cense  to  organise  bus  traffic  in  the  Landkreis  Stendal  qualify  as  state aid within the meaning of Art. 87 TEC? If yes,  then they would be sub‐ject  to  the Commission’s  competences under  the Treaty provisions on state aid. The  Court’s  response  sounds  like  old‐fashioned  legal  formalism: following  its own case  law, the Court  finds that an official act does not constitute state aid within the Treaty unless  it  includes an  ‘advantage’ to the beneficiary undertaking. Advantages for the purpose of state aid exclude financial means provided by the state by way of compensation 
 
argued, the first half of the twentieth century saw the acquisition by citizens of a range of 
basic services to which they could claim entitlement as citizens, services funded and provided 
by the state and thus excluded from the scope of the market. These are sometimes seen as 
constituents of ‘social citizenship’ but they can, equally, be seen as supplying the precondi-
tions for core citizenship by enabling citizens to acquire and maintain the capacities needed 
for its equal exercise.’ 
 74. My translation; see Expert Committee to the German Federal Ministry of Commerce 
[Wissenschaflicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft], ‘Daseinsvorsorge’ im 
europäischen Binnenmarkt, 2002, 7. 
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for public service obligations taken on by the service provider. But the Court  goes  further,  operationalizing  its  own  distinction  by  four  crite‐ria:75  (1)  The  recipient must  be  required  to  discharge  clearly  defined public  service  obligations;  (2)  The  parameters  of  the  calculated  com‐pensation must be established in advance in an objective and transpar‐ent  manner;  (3)  The  compensation  must  not  exceed  costs  plus  a reasonable  profit;  (4)  Decisions  are  to  be  taken  either  after  a  public procurement  procedure  or  the  level  of  compensation  is  to  be  deter‐mined  on  the  basis  of  an  analysis  of  the  costs  of  typical  undertaking, well run and adequately provided with adequate means of transport. These responses do bear some problems. They need to be further concretized  and  their  implementation  will  be  challenging.  But  they have high normative qualities: European  law does not take a stand for or against the organisation of public services through national welfare states;  it  decides  neither  for  nor  against  the  market.  Instead  it  puts justificatory pressure on national politics and forces those who organ‐ise  public  services  to  explain  how  they  fulfil  their  social  mandate.  It ‘constitutionalizes’  the  multi‐level  system  so  as  to  accommodate  the decentralised exercise of  formative (national) political  freedom, whilst at  the same time allowing  for European concerns to afford market  ac‐cess to non‐local suppliers. And if this were to prove a successful solu‐tion  guaranteeing  and  manifesting  some  social  sense  in  national practices,  then  it  would  be  an  achievement  that  so  far  has  remained hardly  conceivable  in  most  integrated  political  systems76—a  ‘proce‐dural’ conflict solution par excellence. C. VERBA DOCENT: ON THE PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS What I am now trying  is to bring the abstract deliberations in the  first part and the analyses of the second part into a synthesis. I will proceed in three steps. The first follows the understanding of Europe as a multi‐level  system,  to  demonstrate  its  implications  for  integration  policy. Normative  dependencies  of  political  action  become  apparent  in  this process and are being re‐conceptualised, in a second step, in legal cate‐gories. In a final step l will sketch out the legal constitution of the Euro‐peanization  process  itself,  which,  it  is  my  claim,  must  be  designed procedurally,  in order to overcome the  impasses of European  law and the methodological nationalism in comparative law and PIL. 
 
 75. Case C-280/00 (note 68), paras. 89–95. 
 76. See, Zürn/Joerges (eds.), Governance and Law in Post-National Constellations. 
Compliance in Europe and Beyond, 2005. 
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I. Farewell to Orthodox Supranationalism Europe is no federation, but more than a regime. It  is a heterarchically structured  multi‐level  system.  It  must  organise  its  political  action  in networks.  Since  the  powers  and  resources  for  political  action  are  lo‐cated at various and relatively autonomous levels in the EU, the coping with  functionally  interwoven  problem‐constellations  will  depend  on the  communication  between  the  various  actors  who  are  relatively autonomous  in  their  various  domains,  but  at  the  same  time mutually dependent.77  Jürgen  Neyer  formulated  his  thesis  in  a  most  concrete fashion,  usually  avoided  by  political  scientists:  the  EU‐specific  condi‐tions  for political action favour a deliberative mode of  communication that  is  bound  by  rules  and  principles  and  where  arguments  are  ac‐cepted only if they are capable of universal application.78 These consid‐erations  can help  legal  science  to  satisfy  an undeniable  need  to afford its declarative statements some normative value. But they cannot sub‐stitute the argumentative construction of normative statements specific to law, and they leave room for additional argumentation. To translate Neyer’s  argument:  the  European  legal  framework  is  not  designed merely  to  secure  fundamental  freedoms;  but  neither  to  create  a  new European  state.  The  purpose  of  European  law  is  instead  to  discipline the interactions necessary within the Community to act politically. It is to  guide  strategic  action  into  a  deliberative  style  of  politics.  It  should leave behind ‘vertical’ (‘orthodox’) supranationalism and instead found its validity as law on the normative (deliberative) quality of the political processes  that  create  it.79 To which we may add:80 No  state  in Europe can  make  or  refrain  from  making  decisions  without  causing  ‘extra‐territorial’ effects on  its neighbours. Provocatively put, but brought to its  logical  conclusion,  this  means:  nationally  organised  constitutional states are becoming unable to act democratically. They  cannot  include in  the  electoral  processes,  determining  the  democratic  sovereign,  all those who will be affected by their decisions. And vice versa: their citi‐zens  cannot  influence  the  behaviour  of  those  political  actors who  are 
 
 77. See above A. IV. 
 78. ‘Discourse and Order in the EU. A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Gove-
mance,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 41 (2003), 687; more detailed in his habilitation 
thesis, Postnationale politische Herrschaft, 2004. 
 79. See Joerges/Neyer, with Jürgen Neyer. ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to 
Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology,’ 3 (1997) European 
Law Journal 273; Joerges, ‘Good Governance’ in the European Internal Market: Two Com-
peting Legal Conceptualisation of European Integration and their Synthesis,’ in: von Bog-
dandy/Mavroides/Mény (eds.), European Integration and International Co-ordination. Studies 
in Transnational Economic Low in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 2002, 219. 
 80. See Joerges, ‘The Impact,’ ibid. (note 28). 
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taking  the  relevant  decisions  for  them.  It would  thus  seem  legitimate for Europe  to  require  its Member  States  to design  their national  laws with a view to accommodate Community law. It would also seem sensi‐ble  to  afford Member  States’  citizens  legal  rights  that  are  truly  Euro‐pean  because  they  allow  national  citizens  to  compare  their  own  laws with the laws and the experiences in other Member States. 
II. European Law as Choice of Law and the Constitutionalization of 
Transnational Governance The  normative  claims  identified  above  of  ‘deliberative  supranational‐ism’  should not  be portrayed as  some  remote wish  list. They are well documented  and  somewhat  canonised  in  real  existing  European  law: Member  States of  the Union may not  enforce  their  interests  and  their laws  unboundedly.  They  are  bound  to  respect  European  freedoms. They may not discriminate.  They may only pursue  ‘legitimate’  regula‐tory  policies  approved  by  the  Community.  They  must  coordinate  in relation to what regulatory concerns they can follow, and design their national  regulatory  provisions  in  the  most  Community‐friendly  way. What  is the meaning of all this,  for the relationship between European and national  law  in general, and the Europeanization of private  law  in particular? Two  complementary  patterns  of  legalisation,  of  Verrechtlichung, and responsibilities  for the law, may be differentiated. All of the above principles  and  rules  substantiating  a  ‘deliberative  suprnationalism’ affect how we deal with differences between laws. They  impose a duty on Member States to take into consideration ‘foreign’ affairs and inter‐ests. To European law, they have assigned the task of making sure that national  law  is  compatible  with  Community  principles.  In  that  sense, the law of the Community is a  ‘choice‐of‐law’ (‘Kollisionsrecht’). It does more  than  traditional  PIL,  in  that  its  decision‐making  criteria  are  not there to identify the geographically closer or factually preferable law or decide between colliding interests in the application of the law. It does not  work  on  the  assumption  that  between  equally  involved  national laws  a  choice  should  be made.  Rather,  it  requires  national  laws  to  be made  Community‐compatible  through  innovation  and  modification, and the development and observance of principles and  rules,  in order to  organise  the  differences  between  them.  All  these  factors  impose limits on national sovereignty.  In addition, Union  citizens are afforded rights  that  are  directly  applicable  in  their  own  as much  as  in  foreign Member States—forcing a duty on  the national  legislator  to  justify  its actions in a European forum. 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Member States are being asked to make changes to their legal sys‐tems—changes  that  should  in  principle  take  place  there,  for  them  to effectively guarantee that Europe’s innovative impact will help national legal systems to evolve sensibly.81 However,  this  is but one side of  the process. Building on just those measures that are promoting free trade and  the  Europeanization  of  our  markets  and  rejecting  the  individual states’  interests  and  orientations,  European  transnational  governance structures  have  developed  and  unfolded  their  own  logic  and  signifi‐cance. This  holds  true  for  all  domains  of  regulatory  policy82—including the  traditional  realm  of  ‘private  law’,  at  least  indirectly.83  And  in  all those fields where private  law  instruments are being deployed for the organization  of  transnational  activities,  suitable  arrangements  are likely to establish themselves. Regulatory politics have seen an  intense debate for some time on the question of how these new forms of trans‐national  governance  can  be  conceptualised  legally  (‘constitution‐alized’). Discussions are equally  intense in the area of competition pol‐icy after its ‘modernization’ in Regulation 1/2003.84 85 It is only a matter  of time for those discussions to reach private law. 
III. Juridifying the Europeanization Process Private  law  cannot  ignore  the  postnational  constellation  it  finds  itself placed  in.  It cannot pretend there  is still a set of autonomous national legal systems. It can do equally little about the fact that Europe is not a state, and is not on  its way to statehood. All it can do is  try to bind po‐litical processes to  legal principles and to  influence  law making  in the European  multi‐level  system.  The  literature  on  Europeanization  of private  law  talks too  little  about these  framework conditions.  It  is not obvious which  legislative  institution  in Europe would be competent to write a Civil Code that could absorb the rich diversity of European legal traditions.  It  is  not  obvious  how  any  such  Code  could  keep  pace with the evolutionary dynamic of  regulatory politics.  There are no  signs of an expansion of the European judiciary, yet an expansion seems indis‐
 
 81. See the remarks in note 28 and also Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition versus Har-
monisation in European Company Law,’ Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2 
(1999), 231. 
 82. See Joerges, Europarecht 2002, 17. 
 83. See above B. III. 
 84. OJ L 2003/1 of 4 January 2003. See also: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition 
/antitrust/legislation/proceduraI_rules/comments/ 
 85. The Commission home page gives an impression: http://europa.eu.int/comm/com-
petition/antitrust/legislation/proceduraI_rules/comments/ 
2009 Europeanization as Process 
 
39 
pensable, if the new law is to enjoy effective validity.86 The status quo is anything but  ideal. Europeanization takes place  in an  incremental  and fragmented  fashion.  Citizens  seeking  to  enforce  their  legal  rights  are being subjected to unacceptable burdens. Yet, over all we are facing an innovative process full of opportunities. Typically,  the  most  problematic  amongst  the  case  law  constella‐tions analysed  in part two is the one that rigorously brings to bear the principles  emerging  from  the  formative  period  of  European  law.  The ECJ  ‘s  thesis  that the provisions of  the Product Liability Directive have effected a ‘complete harmonisation’, undeniably ignores that if product liability law is to be applied sensibly, it should be placed in the particu‐lar context of elements of fault and liability, objective standards of neg‐ligence,  product  safety  legislation and  self‐regulation  (standardization and  certification).  It  is  hard  to  imagine  how  the  ECJ  could  not  have taken these circumstances into account, but equally difficult to see how its punctual intervention could contribute sensibly to the Europeaniza‐tion of product liability and product safety law. Things  are  different  for  company  law.  Here  the  ECJ  pronounced clear and consistent orientation points  in a way that is manageable  for secondary  Community  law  as  well  as  national  legal  systems.  The  ECJ has conferred political rights on the ‘market citizen’, without affording either  the market  or market  citizens  law‐making  powers.  The  Court’s findings  on  the  privatisation  of  public  services  appears  to me  equally productive.  Legal  traditions,  social  expectations,  political  preferences, administrative  know‐how  and  market  innovation—all  these  are  very different  between  Brittany  and  Estonia,  between  Faroe  Islands  and Sicily. Europe seems destined to  institute  innovation and to encourage social  learning.  It  is not Europe’s  job to subject  the continent to a uni‐tary regime. The incrementalism of the Europeanization process is challenging but  also  full  of  opportunities.  Europe  is  no  polity  in  the  way  nation states are.  It will have  to  live with  its  complex diversity  illustrated  in the  case  law  above:  primary  law  granting  fundamental  freedoms  and basic  rights;  transnational  governance  arrangements  in  numerous 
 
 86. ‘Kommt die Geschäftswelt nicht ganz gut zurecht?’—‘but isn’t the business world 
doing quite well?’—Ernst Steindorff asked more than a decade ago (see the report of the 
symposium ‘Alternativen zur legislatorischen Rechtsvergleichung‘ by Oliver Remien in Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationals Privatrecht 56 (1992), 261 ff., 300 ff.], just to 
re-pose the question now (Aufgaben künftiger europäischer Privatrechtssetzung angesichts 
deutscher Erfahrungen, Festschrift Peter Ulmer 2003, 1393, 1407, note 63) and to add to its 
context: those who lobby for greater legislative ambit in Europe should also ask for a corre-
sponding expansion of Europe's judiciary’s powers which nobody will be eager to finance. 
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fields of regulatory politics; legislative and judicial interventions affect‐ing only a section of the national legal systems and leading to irritation. This diversity  creates by no means a comfortable situation. Maybe we will  find  that  its  complexity  exceeds  our  learning  capacities.  But  I  am confident  that  it makes  no  sense  simply  to  imagine  a more  simplistic legal landscape. 
